To Buy or Sell

Because Simon Magus sought to purchase the gift of the Spirit, some associate simony particularly with the sin of buying the Holy Spirit.¹See {Thomas of Strasbourg}, Commentaria in IIII Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, arg. 1 (fol. 150r). However, all serious treatments of the matter affirm that simony is committed in both selling and buying. On this point, many refer back to fifth-century pope Gelasius I and his epistle to the bishops of Lucania, Bruttium, and Sicily, whose twenty-fourth chapter declares, “both giver and receiver alike are caught in the damnation of Simon.”²Gelasius I, Epistolae, Ep. 14, cap. 24 (p. 375). cf. Gratian, Decretum, C. 1, q. 1, c. 6. Peter Lombard wrote, “both the givers and the receivers are called simoniacs, and both are struck by the same sentence.”³Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, c. 2 (p. 909).

Referring to older sources, perhaps going back to Chalcedon, canon 3 of the Second Council of Braga (572) describes “the ancient decree of the fathers” as saying “cursed be the giver and receiver.”⁴Migne, ed., Concilium Bracarense Secundum, c. 3 (PL 84:571C–D). Henry Burton cited this canon favorably⁵Burton, A Censure of Simonie, 52. and elsewhere wrote that sellers “are as deep in simony, as buyers.”⁶Ibid., 31. In support, he cites Ecclesiasticus 27:2 (“As a nail sticketh fast between the joinings of the stones; so doth sin stick close between buying and selling.”).

In this chapter, we will first examine the symmetry and asymmetry between buying and selling, considering the relative gravity of each. We will then turn to cases where the buyer may be entirely innocent even while the seller is guilty. From there, we will consider the simoniacal nature of withholding spiritual things, whether by silence, false teaching, or refusal to minister. Finally, we will survey the broader circle of guilt, tracing the ways one may participate indirectly in the sin.

Relative Gravity

Wycliffe identified selling and buying as two sides of one coin. Referring to them as “gehazia” (gesia) for selling and “simon” (simonia) for buying,⁷See Chapter 10, ↗ for more on this label for selling. he refused to grant primacy to either: “And these two poisons, the new and the old, follow one another as correlatives, and each embraces the name of the other.”⁸Wycliffe, Tractatus de Simonia, cap. 1 (2:11–13). The twelfth-century master Hugh of St. Victor spoke similarly when he remarked, “the followers of these, as they are not diverse in error, are not distinguished in damnation.”⁹Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis, II, p. 10, c. 2 (PL 176:477D).

Further, Wycliffe took issue with this definition of simony since it speaks of “buying and selling” rather than “buying or selling.” Wycliffe acknowledged that the art of Latin definitions is not to speak disjunctively; that is, they tend to use “and” (et) in listing matters rather than “or” (vel). As such, one might technically be cleared of charges because he has only bought or only sold. Wycliffe’s solution was to simply use the word “exchange” (commutacio) to remove ambiguity.¹⁰Wycliffe, Tractatus de Simonia, cap. 1 (3:2–8). Note that because the English language does not suffer from the same idiomatic expectation, we have taken the liberty to render Aquinas’s definition disjunctively as “buying or selling.”

On one hand, these statements affirming a symmetry of action are unobjectionable; no simoniacal transaction can occur without both seller and buyer. However, if they are to be taken as statements of gravity, as though each mode of transaction is equally heinous, there are reasons to regard the sale of spiritual things as worse than the purchase of spiritual things. In the words of Bonaventure, “A bishop who sells sins more gravely than a subject who buys.”¹¹Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, dub. 3 (p. 657). Returning to Gregory’s influential fourth homily on the gospels, he observed that Simon sought “to more wrongly sell what he had wrongly bought.”¹²Gregory I, Homiliae in Evangelia, 4.4 (p. 25). Similarly, Basil of Caesarea wrote in his fifty-third epistle, “He who through ignorance wants to buy is less guilty than he who sells the gift of God.”¹³Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 53 (p. 339). While the focus of this statement is on the culpability associated with one’s understanding, it likewise demonstrates an association between culpability and sale. The seller of a spiritual thing is far more likely to be aware that the sale is illicit than the purchaser. Further, as the schoolmen argued, the seller gives what he does not own, and what he has been commanded to give freely (Matt. 10:8; 1 Cor. 4:1).¹⁴See Chapter 11, ↗. The purchaser does not labor under the same obligations as the minister.

Licit Purchases

While the buyer may be less guilty than the seller, he may also be completely innocent. This occurs particularly in the case of a spiritual good that is being wrongly withheld from a purchaser. In such a case, the purchaser essentially pays a ransom. In typical scholastic writings, such a purchaser is said to “redeem vexation” (redimere vexationem), or perhaps more idiomatically in English we might say that he buys off the harassment.

A number of discussions on this notion point back to Innocent IV’s Commentaria on the decretals.¹⁵See, e.g., the later discussion in Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.24 (fol. 75ra). Admitting that the seller is guilty in a simoniacal exchange, he entertained the question of whether the buyer must be:

However, to a layman whom it is clear has no jurisdiction—if he despoils him of a church, or would cause him to be shunned de facto as though excommunicated—or even to a cleric who does not claim he acted by right, but by force, it is permitted to give [a payoff]. Because he gives nothing for a spiritual thing, but only for vexation, which it is permitted to redeem.¹⁶Innocent IV, Commentaria, ad X 5.3.24 (fol. 500r).

The preceding text had dealt with a situation where the oppressor was a superior, but here the oppressor is one without real church authority but has some mechanism of defrauding a bishop. Innocent used this case because it is clear that nothing spiritual is being bought, since the lay person has nothing spiritual to sell. The one who pays him is only buying off the harassment.

Aquinas described a similar dynamic: “It must be said that before one acquires a right to a bishopric, […] it would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of adversaries with money; for in this way, he would prepare a path for himself to obtain a spiritual thing through money. But after the right has already been acquired by someone, it is lawful to remove unjust impediments by means of money.”¹⁷Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 2, ad 5; cf. Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 7. In summary, it would be wrong for someone unqualified for a spiritual office to purchase that office. However, for someone who is qualified for that office and unjustly kept from it, it is not necessarily wrong to remove that injustice by means of payment. We might make an analogy in terms of human trafficking. While it would be wrong to buy humans as chattel, no one would fault a man for ransoming a kidnapped family member. The kidnapper is guilty in the sale, but the ransomer is innocent.

In his gloss on Matthew 10:8, John Major argued that this principle can be applied not only when the purchaser himself is being kept from something he has a right to, but any time it would keep the seller from some evil action: “It is licit to give money to a man so that he abandons his vice or accommodates himself to virtue.”¹⁸Major, In Matthaeum ad Literam Expositio, 10:8 (fol. 41rb). If it may be permissible to pay an elector to elect an unsuitable bishop, then it may be permissible to pay him to elect a suitable one.¹⁹“Therefore I can licitly give money to someone so that he does not elect an unsuitable person, [since] I have an acquired right to this. And then, speaking consequently, it seems it must be conceded that I can give money to an elector so that he elects a suitable person. And of two demonstrated [candidates], namely a more suitable and a less suitable, I can give money not to elect the less suitable, holding that he sins by electing the less suitable, because I can remove this man from sin. And where one alone would be suitable, I can give money to elect this suitable one, because if the benefice is given to another, the collator or elector sins, and by giving it to this maximally suitable one he does not sin: therefore I can buy him the benefice.” Ibid., 10:8 (fol. 41rb). Redeeming the vexation distinguishes itself from bibery in that it uses money to turn the wicked away from injustice.

This exemption for “redeeming vexation” continued with Protestant authors. To include a Puritan example, Ames concurred, “Neither [is it properly simony] if any thing is given by him, which hath a certain and undoubted right to the spiritual function, for the avoiding of unjust troubles.”²⁰Ames, Conscience, 5.230. Luther himself defended the concept,²¹“Now if I wanted to bargain with the Pope thus: ‘I will give you so many thousand gold pieces yearly, and you let me freely and sincerely preach the Gospel.’ Would that be simony? No. For I am not buying what I already have, namely the legitimate use of the sacraments, the sincere doctrine of the Gospel, of faith, of hope, of the expectation of the life to come, all of which have been granted to me even against the Pope’s will and without his authority. I only seek, by offering a thousand gold pieces, to redeem that vexation.” Luther, Vorlesungen über 1. Mose, 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:12–19). going so far as to encourage ruling Protestant authorities to give to the pope a yearly sums of thousands of crowns “that the shedding of blood and other scandals might cease, and the Gospel could be spread in peace.”²²Ibid., 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:21–24). He added, “This is no simony but the redemption of vexation.”²³Ibid., 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:24).

Two examples are repeatedly offered as case studies for this dynamic: Jacob’s birthright and baptisms unjustly withheld. Following the exemption through both, we will also examine how prudence must govern its use.

Jacob’s Birthright

In Genesis 25:29–34, Esau sells his birthright to Jacob. While the birthright itself may be composed of physical inheritances, there is a spiritual quality associated with primogeniture, the right of the firstborn, the firstborn serving as priests until the days of Aaron (Exod. 13:2; Num. 3:11–13).²⁴This is most commonly discussed among the medievals, but for a Puritan example that addresses Jacob and Esau, see Burton, A Censure of Simonie, 57. Because of this, it seems that there may be nothing wrong in selling or buying spiritual things.

The common response at this point was that Jacob was free to purchase the birthright because it was owed to him.²⁵E.g., “The right of the firstborn was due to Jacob by divine election, according to that of Malachi 1[:2], ‘Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.’ And therefore, Esau sinned by selling the birthright; Jacob, however, did not sin by buying, because it is understood that he [merely] redeemed his own vexation.” [Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 4; cf. Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 3.] Some argued that Jacob should be understood as disinclined to purchase the birthright, only speaking of it this way to persuade his wicked brother to comply.^[E.g., “Although he said to his brother, ‘Sell me your birthright,” he understood it as ‘Give me the birthright, which in your judgment is through a sale.’” Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 147rb).]

Luther took issue with these discussions, describing the idea of simony in Genesis 25 as the “fantasies” of “sophists,”²⁶“That the sophists say this sale is simony, we do not care. They say Jacob did not sin, but Esau did because he sold spiritual goods; but these are fantasies.” Luther, Predigten über das erste Buch Mose, 45 (WA 14, 330:1–3). but his solution differed little. Where the medievals spoke of Jacob being due the birthright by divine election, Luther contended that it was forfeit on account of Esau’s contempt.²⁷“Esau would have sinned even if he had given it away for free, he who rather ought to have expended his life for the dignity of the primogeniture given by God. Therefore, the despiser is despised; trifling with the gift of God, he loses it. Rightly, what the brother despises, Jacob claims for himself—whether by ambush, by price, or for free.” Ibid., 45 (WA 14, 330:25–28). Lecturing on the same passage years later, he added that there was no transaction of a spiritual thing at all, the birthright being on this account already transferred into Jacob’s hands.²⁸“It is not a real transaction, because the birthright is already beforehand in Jacob’s hands, and Esau has been stripped of it. With Jacob is the possession, but without the name. With Esau is the name without the possession.” Luther, Vorlesungen über 1. Mose, 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:25–28). Though dismissing the label of “simony,” Luther still spoke of Jacob’s stew as a “redemption of vexation.”²⁹Ibid., 25:31–34 (WA 43, 420:13–16). In describing a hypothetical bargain with the pope, he claimed, “I am not buying; I am merely throwing a morsel and red lentils at my adversary.”³⁰Ibid., 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:19–20). Shortly thereafter, he described Jacob giving the stew as “throwing Cerberus a sop” ibid., 25:31–34 (WA 43, 425:30–31).

Baptisms Held to Ransom

Though it does not appear directly in Lombard’s Sentences, the schoolmen addressed this question on the fifth distinction of book four. In the context of having asserted that heretics are indeed able to administer legitimate baptisms, the question arises for simoniacs. If the wicked administrator of the sacrament is not just any kind of heretic but a simoniac, would one be able to legitimately receive baptism? If the recipient of baptism were to pay the administrator, he may potentially engage in simony himself, invalidating the work since wicked men cannot receive a legitimate baptism.

Often, the same answer is given at this point, albeit with additional caveats. One who pays to be rid of the priest’s harassment does not engage in simony, even though the seller does.³¹See Albert the Great, Commentarii in IV Sententiarum, IV, d. 5, a. 1, ad quaest. 2 (p. 106a); William de Vaurouillon, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, L4.D5.20 (fol. 228r). The additional caveats arise from the aforementioned conclusions about the ex opere operato efficacy of the work. If baptism can be administered by so many, it should be easy enough to find someone else to do the work. In the case of a parent for a child, even the parent could perform the baptism himself.

Others insisted that because simony is so great a sin, the baptism of the Spirit—or a baptism of true desire—suffices in such a condition, and no one should pay a simoniac for baptism.³²See Biel, Collectorium, IV, d. 5, q. 1 (sig. g2va); {Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 3, q. 1, ad 8 (p. 385b). However, it also appears that works coming to this conclusion do not consider the category of a payment designed to redeem from unjust opposition. John Duns Scotus had perhaps the most thorough discussion of this problem, considering both sides, but ultimately deciding such a baptism could not be purchased.³³Scotus, Quaestiones in Quartum Librum Sententiarum, IV, d. 5, q. 2 (16, p. 518). One commentator noted that he did not speak in “the mode of the ancients” by employing the phrase “redeeming from vexation,” suspecting that this justification does not apply in this case of particular difficulty.³⁴Ibid., IV, d. 5, q. 2 (16, p. 518).

The same principle of removing impediments was extended from the case of one’s own baptism to the case of another’s coming to the faith at all. The canonist Panormitanus perhaps gave the fullest summary, acknowledging that authorities had divided, but he ultimately concluded that one may financially assist in the process if the potential convert already has sufficient motivation to convert. He illustrated it with the observation that “many Jews have amassed great wealth through the depravity of usury and fear coming to the faith because they would have to restore all that was wrongfully taken.” One may licitly help such a convert make restitution since the payment clears an obstacle to embracing the faith rather than making a simoniacal appeal to cupidity.³⁵Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.9 (fol. 70vb).

The Rule of Prudence

The category for redeeming vexation is genuine, but as we have seen with baptism, it is narrower than it may at first appear. It is not a blanket license, but requires prudential judgment to weigh the good the payment secures against the harm it entails: complicity in another’s sin, perpetuation of an evil custom, and scandal on the church. Thus, we observed that Scotus declined to speak “in the mode of the ancients.”

Perhaps it is for this reason that Wycliffe spoke of buying and selling as so certainly symmetric. Hus followed after him. Both were concerned not so much with how to live in spite of corruption as with how to confront it directly. Surveying the landscape of his own day, Hus judged that one who qualified to hold office should never pay a fee to enter, and continued proleptically:

But immediately you will object to this: “If this is how it ought to be, then no one should give money, and the officials will not allow it; if everyone did this, no one would be a parish priest.” To this I say that if everyone did so, the officials would have to admit them whether they liked it or not.

But you say again: “If I do not give money, another will.” To this I say that if you wish to excuse yourself by that argument, then even the executioner, the bailiff, and the harlot will excuse themselves; for each of them says: “If I am not the executioner or the bailiff, another will be; if I am not a harlot, another will be.”

You may yet say: “But others commonly give money.” And I answer that others commonly sin, yet that does not mean you should sin.

You may yet say: “But it is an ancient custom.” And I say that an evil custom, the longer it endures, the greater punishment it incurs from God, as I shall demonstrate later. And I marvel why we do not keep the older and good custom of the holy apostles, which they received from Christ, when he said to them: “Freely you have received, freely give.” And why do they not fear the blessing of St. Peter, which he gave to Simon, saying: “Your money perish with you, because you thought you could obtain the gift of God with money.”³⁶Hus, O svatokupectví, 7.B.

On one hand, Hus’s rhetoric is stark, painting in black and white. He calls the purchase a sin without pausing to qualify, and nowhere does he affirm the category of redeeming vexation. Yet neither should we presume he meant to deny it altogether. Each answer to each objection is, in effect, a step in this exercise of prudence. That Luther, a self-declared Hussite,³⁷Writing to Georg Spalatin in 1520, Luther confessed, “we are all Hussites without knowing it.” Luther, Briefwechsel, no. 254 (WA Br 2, 42:22–25). later commended such purchases need not imply a theological divergence from his forerunner. Rather, life on different sides of the Reformation required different strategies for faithfulness.

Withholding Spiritual Things

Beyond the strict categories of buying and selling where something spiritual is exchanged, what about those times when a spiritual thing is withheld? If a minister refuses to give freely what he has freely received (Matt. 10:8), he violates this command no less than if he had sold it. The withholding of spiritual things for material gain is therefore itself a species of simony.

No pressure should be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give “through the withholding of spiritual things that are owed, for that would have a certain appearance of selling.”³⁸Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 3. Or more directly, “If a minister or pastor of the Church were unwilling to teach you about the forgiveness of sins and the benefits of the Gospel, and refused you absolution unless you redeemed it from him for a hundred gold pieces—that would be simoniacal.”³⁹Luther, Vorlesungen über 1. Mose, 23:3–4 (WA 43, 281:27–29). This is true even in extreme conditions. William Vorilong presented the question: “If a curate has nothing in the parish to live on, can he withhold divine services?”⁴⁰William de Vaurouillon, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, III, d. 3, q. 2 (fol. 164r). Appealing to canon law, he answered, “It is said that he cannot; otherwise he would be considered a simoniac.”⁴¹Ibid., III, d. 3, q. 2 (fol. 164r).

First, we will demonstrate this prohibition by way of the particular example of false teaching. Afterward, we will qualify the nature of the obligation to give rather than withhold, which does not apply equally to all outside the office of minister.

The Example of False Teaching

A clear case in point for this is the nature of false teaching. Selling false spiritual things is recognized as simony as surely as selling true ones. Protestants and medievals alike admitted this, although often indirectly. For example, Protestants, though identifying indulgences as false, typically regard their sale as simony.⁴²See Chapter 1, ↗. Among the medievals, the frequent appeal to the simoniacally distributed false priesthood of Jeroboam demonstrates the same.⁴³See Chapter 10, ↗. Hus used 2 Peter 2:3 (“in their greed they will exploit you with false words”) in his description of a distinct class of simoniacs who are liars.⁴⁴Hus, O svatokupectví, 3.B. Furthermore, 2 Corinthians 2:17 (“peddle the word of God”) is frequently applied to this effect.

However, The Anatomy of Simon Magus puts it precisely, dividing simony into two categories. While the latter is setting to sale what is true, making it vendible, the former is that simoniacs speak lies: “either for their advantage and gain, they obtrude falsehood and error for truth, and minister to people corrupt, instead of wholesome food; so selling for upright, what is but sophisticate and counterfeit.”⁴⁵The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 76. Such men are “bribed […] to smother the truth and counsel of God.”⁴⁶Ibid., 77.

The minister who “obtrudes” falsehood necessarily withholds truth. The one who “smothers” it does likewise. Though he has received the truth freely and ought to give it freely, he necessarily hides it when he dispenses lies.

The Qualification of Obligation

Of course, not every act of withholding a spiritual good is simoniacal; for one to be guilty on this front, there must be the obligation to “freely give,” which is typically established through spiritual office. In the words of John Major, “It is a general rule, and from natural law, that a man does not acquire ownership of money through an act he is bound to perform freely.”⁴⁷Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio B), d. 25, q. 5 (fol. 187va). Frequently, this is the reason given for why one must not withhold the word or sacraments.

Typically, the example of a judge is given to demonstrate this,⁴⁸E.g., Paludanus, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 5 (p. 319b). especially going back to the words of Augustine: “a judge ought not to sell a true judgment, nor a witness true testimony; but an advocate may sell his just advocacy, and a jurist his true counsel.”⁴⁹Augustine, Epistulae, 153.6.23 (CSEL 44, 423:5–7). This conclusion was deemed sound because the judge and witness must perform their roles, but the advocate and jurist are not so bound.⁵⁰E.g., “A judge is bound by his office to render judgment; likewise anyone who is subject to a court is bound to give true testimony. But an advocate is not bound to lend his advocacy to a case, nor a jurist to give counsel.” Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 9. Accordingly, in matters of spiritual judgment—i.e., ecclesiastical courts—such a sale of judgment is simony.⁵¹E.g., “For the advocate selling just advocacy does not sell justice, which is spiritual, but his own act; and the same must be said of the counsel of a jurist. But a judge selling a true judgment commits simony, if he is a spiritual judge; otherwise he does not commit simony, but sins gravely.” Ibid., IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 9. Outside of ecclesiastical courts, such judgments are not truly spiritual in the sense of being derivative of divine revelation, so cannot strictly be called simony.⁵²See Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, In sententias theologicas (Redactio C), IV, d. 25, q. 3 (fol. 315r).

The application to the pastoral office is not that someone outside of it would be permitted to charge for the same activities a minister might perform, but that those outside are certainly not obligated to give freely in the sense of positively giving. The literature also discusses whether a judge could charge for travel expenses to arrive. Some answer “yes”⁵³E.g., ibid., IV, d. 25, q. 3 (fol. 315r). and others “no.”⁵⁴E.g., Peter the Chanter, Noonan, Bribes, 176. These questions, of course, seem to have a bearing on the pastor’s office as well.

Indirect Participation

The tradition of moral theology recognized that one could be guilty not only as the principal agent of any sin but also as an accessory. The schoolmen enumerated nine ways of being complicit in another’s sin, summarized in a widely known mnemonic couplet:

Iussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, Participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans.⁵⁵E.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 62, a. 7; Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio B), d. 15, q. 26 (fol. 96ra).

That is: command, counsel, consent, flattery, harboring, partaking, silence, not hindering, and not disclosing. These were understood to apply to any sin whatever. English authors likewise treated them as a general framework.⁵⁶E.g., Adams, Commentary on 2 Peter, 437–40; Ames, Marrow of Sacred Divinity, 305. “Men may be accessory many ways, by commandment, by counsel, by consent, by partnership, by receiving, by silence when a man ought to speak […].” Perkins, Galatians, 99.

Therefore, while the principal agents of any simoniacal exchange are the buyer and the seller, any mediator is likewise implicated.⁵⁷See Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.8 (fol. 70rb). No author applied all nine modes of indirect participation systematically to simony, but two abbreviated catalogs are worth considering. One is provided by Wycliffe and Hus, and the other is found in the anonymous Anatomy of Simon Magus.

Wycliffe and Hus’s Six Ways

While he introduced these categories more generally elsewhere,⁵⁸Wycliffe, Tractatus de Officio Regis, cap. 4 (pp. 68ff.). Wycliffe applied six modes of consent to the sin of simony, presenting them in a couplet similar to the one above.

Consentit operans, defendens, consilium dans Ac auctorisans, non iuvans nec reprehendens.⁵⁹Wycliffe, Tractatus de Simonia, cap. 8 (98:19–20).

That is: one consents by aiding, defending, counseling, authorizing, not helping, and not reproving. He went on to give some description of these in the subsequent paragraph.⁶⁰Ibid., cap. 8 (98:21–99:8).

Hus took this application of the framework and expanded it in the ninth chapter of his own treatise. While critical editions do not typeset it accordingly, he seemed to have intended a similar couplet in Czech:

pomocí, obranú, radú, potvrzením, nepomocí a netresktáním⁶¹Hus, O svatokupectví, 9.A.

“So that people may guard against simony on every side,” Hus wrote, “we must further know that everyone who consents to simony sins thereby and shares in simony.”⁶²Ibid., 9.A. He then considered each of the six in turn.

By aid: One is guilty of simony “by interceding, brokering among simoniacs, or otherwise providing occasion, whether by letters, by messages, by lending money, by holding their case in court, or by other means.”⁶³Ibid., 9.A.

By defense: Many incur the guilt of simony by defending it, either excusing all who have not been condemned by human courts or at other times obfuscating the nature of the payment, claiming that it is made for labor rather than any spiritual thing. However, such defenses are typically not absent direct participation in the sin since they are often offered “because they themselves run the same course.”⁶⁴Ibid., 9.A. From there, Hus gave a running commentary on Matthew 23:2–8 along with other comments on passages in the gospels, describing the pride, hypocrisy, and love of honor among the masters of his day, extending his exposition of this mode of participation longer than the other five combined.⁶⁵Ibid., 9.A–D.

By counsel: One partakes of simony by devising ways for the buyer or seller to accomplish a simoniacal exchange. Hus described a great company of such advisors at the papal court, “who devise […] all manner of wondrous tricks, and all so that the pope and they may gather more money and the buyers may give more,” though hoping that many were not like this.⁶⁶Ibid., 9.E. He added that “to describe all these devices, even just those I know of, would take far too long.”⁶⁷Ibid., 9.E.

By confirmation: All are partakers who assent to simony. Hus placed particular blame on “the powerful kings, princes, and lords, bishops and other dignitaries, who ought to suppress it.”⁶⁸Ibid., 9.F. He rejected the excuse of one in a position of power who would claim disinterest in the affairs of clergy. A prince who was slandered, robbed, or cuckolded would take vengeance at once, yet simony is a far greater offense since it is against the Holy Spirit himself.⁶⁹Ibid., 9.F.

By not helping: Following the preceding concerns, one who has power to prevent his neighbor from sinking in sin toward damnation should act to prevent it. Hus illustrated the point with an analogy: “anyone who sees a person drowning in water and, being able to help, does not help, would be guilty of that person’s death.”⁷⁰Ibid., 9.G.

By not reproving: When one is silent regarding simony, he participates in the sin of simony. On this point, Hus appealed to Romans 1:32 (“not only those who do such things are worthy of death, but also those who consent to those who do them”) and Isidore as cited by Gratian: “Whoever consents to those who sin and defends another who is sinning shall be accursed both before God and before men, and shall be punished with the most cruel punishment.”⁷¹Ibid., 9.H; cf. Gratian, Decretum, C. 11, q. 3, c. 100. See Friedberg, ed., Corpus Iuris Canonici, 1:671n1050 for parallel transmissions.

Hus concluded his treatment with an adaptation of a parable originating from Wycliffe’s introduction of these six categories in De Officio Regis.⁷²Wycliffe, Tractatus de Officio Regis, cap. 4 (67:28–68:2). Substantially elaborating on Wycliffe’s analogy, Hus described a city that a certain king had established and recaptured from enemies at the cost of his own life. If someone then handed that city over for money against the king’s will, the guilt would extend not only to the one who surrendered it and the one who received it, but also to the broker, the scribes of both parties, the messengers, the sureties, the negotiators, the money lender, the one who supplied the paper for the documents, the community that submitted willingly, and the watchman who did not cry out—in short, everyone who could have helped prevent it. “So it is with simony” because the city that falls victim is that people “whom the Savior himself created and, fighting at the cost of his own life unto death on the cross, liberated from the devil.”⁷³Hus, O svatokupectví, 9.H.

The Anatomist’s Four Ways

Asserting that one may be either a principal agent or an abettor,⁷⁴The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 38. the Anatomist provided four categories of indirect participation: advice, approbation, connivance, and patronization.⁷⁵See ibid., 64–72.

By advice: One incurs the guilt of simony “by promoting of a simoniacal design, in becoming a mediator, or secret agent; either by advice and counsel, or by transacting betwixt the parties, or in behalf of either of them, in any condition, compact, or payment of money; or by using any sinister devices for that effect.”⁷⁶Ibid., 64. On this count, Ezekiel is instructed to prophesy against those who devise mischief and give wicked counsel (Ezek. 11:2–4).⁷⁷See ibid., 65. Likewise, Jezebel’s secret transactions to deliver Naboth’s vineyard to Ahab brought down the same judgment upon her as upon Ahab himself (1 Kings 21:23).⁷⁸See ibid., 65. It is on this ground that Chalcedon decreed so severely against mediators in simoniacal bargains⁷⁹Ibid., 66; cf. Schwartz, ed., Canones Concilii Chalcedonensis, can. 2 (ACO II.2.2, 125). and canon law voided a simoniacal election even when the one elected was ignorant of the payments made on his behalf.⁸⁰The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 66–67; cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.27.

By approbation: “Consent or approbation renders a man guilty of the sin to which he consents.”⁸¹The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 67. On this point, the Anatomist appealed to Psalm 50:18 (“When thou sawest a thief, then thou consentedst with him.”)⁸²Ibid., 67. and Paul’s own confession in Acts 22:20, that “he was consenting to the shedding of the blood of that proto-martyr Stephen.”⁸³Ibid., 67–68. “And, is not he then guilty before God,” asked the Anatomist, “who, seeing one as a thief and a robber, climbing up into the sheepfold of Christ by simoniacal means, yields his consent thereto?”⁸⁴Ibid., 68.

By connivance: One incurs the guilt of simony “when being privy thereto, he winks thereat, or forbeareth, according to his place and calling, either to oppose himself thereto or to censure the same.”⁸⁵See ibid., 68–69. As God threatens those who hide their eyes from child sacrifice (Lev. 20:4), punished Eli for conniving at his sons’ wickedness (1 Sam. 2; 3:13–14), and rebuked Thyatira for suffering Jezebel (Rev. 2:20), so he does to those who wink at simony.⁸⁶See ibid., 69. As Solomon said, “Whoso is partner with a thief hateth his own soul” (Prov. 29:24).⁸⁷Ibid., 70.

By patronizing: Patronizing occurs when one “takes part with simoniacal persons, and bears them out, either by countenancing them in their sin, or by pleading for them, or by setting himself out to justify and defend them therein.”⁸⁸Ibid., 71. This, the Anatomist said, “is such an high degree of fellowship in this sin, as he who doth so, espouseth the interest of Satan, as well as of Simon, and stands upon his side against God.”⁸⁹Ibid., 71. In demonstration, he brought to bear a number of Scripture proofs: adapting the words of Jerubbaal’s father to the men of his city (Judg. 6:31), the Anatomist asked: “Will ye plead for Simon Magus? Will ye defend him?”⁹⁰Ibid., 71. Such a thing is also like helping Ahab (2 Chron. 19:2)⁹¹Ibid., 71–72. or siding with the poor for an evil cause (Exod. 23:3).⁹²Ibid., 72. One should expect severe wrath if he strengthens the hands of evildoers (Jer. 23:14–15).⁹³Ibid., 72.

Conclusion

The sin of simony does not attach to one side of the transaction alone. Both buyer and seller stand condemned, though not equally. The seller—who has received freely and is commanded to give freely—typically bears the greater guilt. The buyer—who may act from ignorance or even from genuine need—may bear less guilt, or in some cases, none at all. When he merely “redeems vexation,” he does not technically buy a spiritual thing, but a temporal thing.

Yet the symmetry of the sin should not be lost in these qualifications. The transaction requires two parties, and each willingly shares in its corruption. Hus’s insistence that the office-seeker should always decline to pay underscores how narrow the exemption for redeeming vexation truly is. Even when redeeming vexation to obtain what is rightfully his, the buyer may become complicit in perpetuating an injustice. Sometimes, prudence requires refusing to participate at all.

The case of withholding extends the logic still further. By virtue of his office, the minister is obligated to give freely. When he is called to offer truth, he may neither be silent nor offer lies. When other spiritual service is called of him, he must give.

Nor does the circle of guilt end with the principal parties. The tradition recognized that one could be complicit in simony through indirect participation—by counseling, defending, brokering, conniving at, or simply failing to oppose a simoniacal transaction. Both Hus and the Anatomist cataloged these modes of complicity at length, and both arrived at the same conclusion: silence and inaction in the face of simony are themselves forms of consent. The sin radiates outward from buyer and seller to implicate all who had power to prevent it and did not.