An Earnest Desire

Simony is an “earnest desire” (studiosa voluntas) to commercialize spiritual things, but the English rendering of this phrase varies across sources. Some have rendered it as a “deliberate will” or “express will.” Thomas Aquinas explained that voluntas indicates that simony is a matter of the will rather than a matter of the intellect, and that studiosa indicates choice (electio).¹Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2. That is, there must be a willful desire for the exchange, not just a rational appetite for spiritual things exceeding that of temporal things. For this reason, the medieval works on simony routinely responded to Daniel 4:27²Vulgate, Dan. 4:24. (“redeem your sins with alms”) as a stock objection.³E.g., Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, In sententias theologicas (Redactio C), IV, d. 25, q. 3, ad 1 (fol. 315r); Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 1, arg. 1; Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 146rb). Gregory the Great’s gloss on Matthew 4:18–22 (“Immediately they left their nets and followed him”) that “the kingdom of God is worth as much as you have”⁴Gregory I, Homiliae in Evangelia, 5.2 (p. 28). often attends this consideration as well.⁵All three works just cited quote it alongside the Daniel text. It is also quoted apart from that text, as at Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 1, q. 4, arg. 5 (pp. 647–48) and Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 1, arg. 3. Answering that “buying” is a metaphor for merit and does not authorize commerce in spiritual things, they conceded that these two authorities demonstrate the propriety of recognizing the surpassing value of spiritual things, and, in that sense, desiring to make such an exchange.⁶E.g., ibid., II-II, q. 100, a. 1, ad 3; Wycliffe, Tractatus de Simonia, cap. 2 (14:31–15:4, 15:11–12).

In other words, the qualifier of “earnest” (studiosa) indicates that in order for this “desire” (voluntas) to be sinful, it must proceed from the will as a choice. There is no sin in recognizing that the things of God are to be valued more than money and that such an exchange, if it were lawful, would be to one’s benefit (Prov. 23:23). The sin is in a desire that discounts those matters which undermine its lawfulness. By way of illustration, we might observe that “lust” is not in recognizing female beauty or even in the desire for sexual intercourse upon lawful conditions, but in the earnest desire (ἐπιθυμῆσαι) that does not fully appreciate such qualifications (Matt. 5:28).

On both of these counts, Wycliffe preferred the phrase “inordinate willing” (inordinata volicio).⁷Ibid., cap. 1 (2:13–16). First, “inordinate” (inordinata) indicates that it is a disordered will, rather than a rightly ordered will that makes licit exchanges for spiritual things. He gave several examples: we are to “buy without money” (Isa. 55:1), teachers are to receive a temporal stipend in the context of their instruction (1 Cor. 9:11), the giving of tithes, offerings, etc.⁸Ibid., cap. 1 (2:16–30). Second, “willing” (volicio) indicates that there must be an act of the will but does not require any extrinsic act (actus extrinsecus). While he acknowledged that this is all almost certainly intended by studiosa voluntas, he believed that inordinata volicio disambiguated the matter.⁹Ibid., cap. 1, 2 (2:36–3:2, 14:31–32).

At least Wycliffe’s second concern—if not his first—is justified in light of some alternative definitions that have been offered. Some medievals proposed that studiosa voluntas be taken to mean “a desire carried through to effect.”¹⁰{Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (p. 382b); cf. Pelbartus Ladislaus of Temesvár, Aureum Sacrae Theologiae Rosarium, IV, s.v. Simonia, 1, ad 1; {Thomas of Strasbourg}, Commentaria in IIII Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, ad 2 (foll. 150r–v). However, such proposals seem to belong more to canonical jurisprudence than moral theology. For example, Richard of Middleton offered this definition because although the desire to buy or sell spiritual things is itself a sin, “it nevertheless does not oblige one to renounce or restore the thing acquired.”¹¹{Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (p. 383a); cf. Pelbartus Ladislaus of Temesvár, Aureum Sacrae Theologiae Rosarium, IV, s.v. Simonia, 1, ad 1. This reading is typically offered along with the alternative of a desire that is “not one that comes over him unawares [subreptoria], but one he chooses [eligens].”¹²{Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (p. 383a); cf. Pelbartus Ladislaus of Temesvár, Aureum Sacrae Theologiae Rosarium, IV, s.v. Simonia, 1, ad 1.

However, this is not the most common understanding of the phrase, nor does it seem to be Aquinas’s. In responding to the objection that his definition is unenforceable on account of it being based on an internal movement of the heart, he wrote, “It must be said that as regards God, the will alone makes a simoniac; but as regards the external ecclesiastical penalty, he is not punished […] but must repent.”¹³Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 6, ad 6.

Our own English rendering of studiosa voluntas as “earnest desire” has been chosen on two counts. First, it reflects Wycliffe’s concern to choose words that describe an activity of the will without requiring an extrinsic activity. To the modern English reader, “deliberate” may exclude the first motions of sinful desires, and “express” may go even further in altogether excluding that which is inward (actus interior). The sin with which we concern ourselves is not one that is only committed when it has been “expressed” in some outward deed. One who earnestly desires to buy or sell spiritual things is one who truly would prefer to make such an exchange over and against considerations to the contrary. Second, this rendering is the one chosen by both Burton¹⁴Burton, A Censure of Simonie, 2. and the Anatomist,¹⁵The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 25, 39. whose model for retrieval we have followed thus far. Apart from any reason to the contrary, it seems right to continue in their pattern.

The frameworks in which theologians have understood “earnest desire” are varied. However, as we have seen with Wycliffe and Aquinas, this diversity existed primarily in terminology rather than substance; there tended to be more alignment in frameworks over time. As such, while we will attempt to provide a meaningful survey that includes earlier sources, we will largely rely on later sources in particular to develop our understanding of the earnest desire of simony in its various degrees of expression and involvement. We will also consider several justifications from motive that have been offered in defense of simoniacal exchanges and the answers given by the schoolmen and canonists. Finally, we will consider the earnest desire in hating simony that must stand against the earnest desire of simony itself.

Taxonomies of Expression

This notion of an earnest desire may be considered from various vantage points. Primarily, one may view it from the aspect of its degree of expression in several stages or its character in several modes.

On this front, two taxonomies developed. These taxonomies overlap considerably, but their distinction lies in their emphasis. The first asks how far the desire has been carried out—from internal desire through attempt to completed deed. The second asks what form the transaction has taken—whether it remains hidden, takes shape in an agreement, or actually results in an exchange.

A Taxonomy of Stages

Simoniacal desire is expressed in several stages. Sometimes, these are enumerated relative to the individual himself, as he expresses his simoniacal will. While not specific to the topic of simony, this feature of human behavior is often discussed by the pairing of “affection” (in affectu) and “effect” (in effectu). For example, John Major concluded his original treatment of simony with the observation that “simony resides in the affection [in affectu] and in the effect [in effectu].”¹⁶Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 149ra).

One need not be capable of executing the deed for his desire to be simoniacal. Major also spoke of a “conditional simony” (simonia conditionalis) where one would like to commit simony upon certain conditions (having enough money, etc.).¹⁷Ibid., d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 145vb). Furthermore, it need not be a positive desire to sell, but could be a negative desire not to give freely. In other words, it may be a matter of nolition (nolitio) rather than volition (volitio).¹⁸“There is some simony that is not a volition nor a habit of it. This is evident: if someone were to have this resolution, ‘I do not wish to give a benefice without money,’ such simony is a nolition, but it is equivalent to a volition.” Ibid., d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 145vb).

The Anatomist added a middle stage of endeavor (in conatu). While the notion of an effect would technically include all such outward actions, the threefold division makes explicit that guilt attaches not only to desire and completed deed but also to the attempt itself, even an unsuccessful one. Simon Magus’s offer was rejected by Peter, yet he was condemned for it. One may therefore be guilty of simony in affectu, in conatu, or in effectu.¹⁹See The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 38.

After explaining each category, the Anatomist went on to describe the various mechanisms by which simony may come to full fruition.²⁰Ibid., 45ff. We will take this up in Chapter 7.

A Taxonomy of Modes

However, more frequently, simoniacal expression is subdivided according to the character of the attempted or completed exchange. These modes of simony are simonia mentalis, simonia conventionalis, and simonia realis.

This threefold taxonomy was a relatively late formulation. Panormitanus, writing in the first half of the fifteenth century, was among the earliest to set it out in his commentary on the decretals. He stated “simony is threefold,” then continued to define mental and conventional simony, leaving the third without any explicit mention.²¹Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.14 (fol. 72rb); cf. Suárez, De Religione, cap. 41, n. 2 (p. 565). These categories were not more fully developed until later by Counter-Reformation theologians.²²See ibid., cap. 41 (p. 565). Regardless, later Protestant authors adopted their terminology.²³E.g., Ames, Conscience, 5.230; {Anonymous}, An Essay Against Simony, 23.

Additionally, earlier authors tended to use these terms as either mutually compatible or even cumulative. When used in the latter sense, they functioned similarly to the aforementioned categories of in affectu/in effectu. That is, simony begins as simonia mentalis and continues by possibly being attached to a pact or coming to fruition in a successfully executed exchange. For example, John Major affirmed that “all simony is mental.”²⁴Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 145va). In the broadest, mutually compatible sense, something labeled “simony” could be any combination of these. Mental simony is anything that is not done in ignorance but carries a simoniacal intent, conventional simony could be any simoniacal exchange involving a pact,²⁵E.g., Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.14 (fol. 72rb). and real simony is simply any simoniacal exchange that comes to full fruition.

But later usage of the terminology converged on a mutually exclusive sense.²⁶E.g., Ames, Conscience, 5.230; {Anonymous}, An Essay Against Simony, 23; Stillingfleet, Bonds of Resignation, 29. Francisco Suárez gave some account of the evolution here. Suárez, De Religione, cap. 41, nn. 2–4 (pp. 565–66). Mental simony referred specifically to those completed exchanges which were outwardly licit and could not be certainly discerned as simoniacal by external actions.²⁷Ibid., cap. 41, n. 3 (pp. 565–66). Conventional simony referred to simoniacal pacts that had not been completed. Real simony referred to outwardly simoniacal exchanges that had been completed.

Of course, the point of these categories was primarily to demonstrate guilt beyond outwardly simoniacal exchanges. Therefore, the category of “real” simony was employed the least²⁸As already seen with Panormitanus. and “mental” the most. Those actions of mental simony are simoniacal only by intent (in foro interiori). So it is said, “intention makes a man a simoniac.”²⁹Intentio facit hominem simoniacum; Bernardus Parmensis, Glossa Ordinaria, 5.3.34 (p. 1159). The Anatomist attributed this quote to Bernardus Compostellanus. The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 39. For example, one who purchases a property with an attached right of patronage may or may not do so for the sake of the advowson, but the one who does is guilty before God.

“Conventional” simony fell between the two in frequency of use. Such agreements need not be verbal; they may be established by mutual understanding alone.³⁰See Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 146ra). Nor does the attempt need to result in an exchange; Simon Magus failed to make any agreement with Peter, yet was condemned for it.³¹See ibid., d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 145vb). As the Fourth Council of Toledo (633) declared, even those who so much as endeavor (moliuntur) to secure an ecclesiastical office with money are unfit for the priesthood.³²Juan Tejada y Ramiro, ed., Fourth Council of Toledo (633), c. 19 (pp. 278–79).

Beyond mere instruction and exhortation, this taxonomy was employed to distinguish corresponding penalties. Mental simony requires penance alone since the ecclesiastical forum cannot judge hidden intentions.³³See Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (foll. 145va, 149ra); Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus), Commentaria, ad X 5.3.20, 29, 34, 38 (foll. 73v, 74r, 76r, 79v, 80r, 80v, 81r). Conventional simony and real simony could result in deposition,³⁴See “a simoniac is to be deposed […] simony […] renders him unfit for the execution of his office.” Ibid., ad X 5.3.6 (fol. 69vb). and any completed simoniacal exchange required restitution.³⁵E.g., “in conventional simony a man is bound to restore such spiritual or temporal things unlawfully received.” Ibid., ad X 5.3.34, no. 5 (fol. 80ra).

Insufficient Motivations

Since simony resides fundamentally in the will, it would seem to follow that one may be able to excuse a simoniacal transaction so long as the underlying motivation is innocent. Medieval theologians therefore found it necessary to counter a number of justifications in which one pointed to pure motivations that contained no malice. However, one need not have malicious intent for his desire to be simoniacal. An earnest desire to buy or sell spiritual things is simoniacal even if it forms out of ignorance or weakness.³⁶See Pelbartus Ladislaus of Temesvár, Aureum Sacrae Theologiae Rosarium, IV, s.v. Simonia, 1; cf. {Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1 (p. 383a). Objections to the contrary reduce to a form of pragmatism rejected by the schoolmen and canonists.

To Raise Sufficient Resources

While many exchanges of spiritual things were for private gain, some had the purpose of maintaining a spiritual work. In particular, monasteries and collegiate churches often had limited resources, and the admission of new members placed real financial burdens on the community. Many therefore justified charging for entrance into the society, claiming that if financial impartiality in admissions were maintained, “then all religious houses would perish, because so many would be placed there that their goods would not suffice; and this seems unfitting.”³⁷Albert the Great, Commentarii in IV Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 5, quaest., s.c. 1 (p. 92b). Such practices were common. In part, their extent may be gauged from Thomas of Strasbourg’s observation that “certain nuns of Germany” very explicitly demanded temporal goods from those who would enter their community.³⁸{Thomas of Strasbourg}, Commentaria in IIII Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2 (fol. 150v). See also Groote, De simonia ad beguttas, 16–18; Lynch, Simoniacal Entry, 220–21. Wycliffe complained of a related practice among the friars, who sold laymen letters of confraternity, ostensibly granting a share in the merits of the order’s masses and prayers for an annual fee. He argued that it went hand in hand with their preaching for money, both being simony.³⁹Wycliffe, Tractatus de Apostasia, cap. 2 (36:22–30).

The canon lawyers and schoolmen gave the same answer at this point: no community may exact a fee for entrance into religious life, but if funds are truly lacking, it may decline to receive those it cannot sustain.⁴⁰For relevant canon law, see Gratian, Decretum, C. 1, q. 2; Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.8, 19, 30. However, if non-contractual, it may receive some gift in order to expand its capacity and admit a new member.⁴¹E.g., “When the possessions of a religious house do not suffice to sustain more persons, then something may be required of one who wishes to serve God in that place—not as a price of religion, but so that the monastery may have the means to provide for him; and therefore simony is not committed. But if he can be received without burden to the church, it is simoniacal to require anything for his reception.” Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 7; cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 4; {Thomas of Strasbourg}, Commentaria in IIII Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2 (fol. 150v).

In the literature, there is some discussion around the degree to which it is acceptable to present the financial need in a way that would not be manipulative or coercive. In general, it is acceptable to state the requirement in cases of need, but apart from this it is not considered right to ask anything.⁴²E.g., {Richard of Middleton}, Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 3, q. 2, ad 6 (p. 386b). John Major recommended permissible communication with a set form of words: “Brother, we cannot comfortably feed more than we have; if it please you to enter this community, bring a portion from which you may be sustained.”⁴³Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio A), d. 25, q. 1 (fol. 148ra). In all of these accounts, necessity (necessitas) may account for requiring money, but a contractual arrangement (pactum) that charges for admission and gives it in return may not.⁴⁴E.g., “To receive [someone] under an agreement (sub pacto), especially where the house has no need, is openly simony. To the argument [that the money is the cause] it must be said that [the payment] is not the cause of granting [admission]; rather, necessity extorts [payment], for they would gladly grant [admission] freely, and so that [need] is why they have an eye to [money] in conferring it.” Albert the Great, Commentarii in IV Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 5, ad quaest. (p. 94b).

While religious societies provided a common case study, the principle held in other areas as well. An actual lack of financial capacity could justify withholding some spiritual benefit until the need was met, but a commercial exchange was not permitted, regardless of how much it may seem advantageous to the work being done. Wycliffe offered the solution to any who consider some noble work financially impossible apart from making commerce out of it: “But first, before men commit simony, they should labor with their hands, or go to another people, or sooner starve in the body.”⁴⁵Wycliffe, Sermons, Sermon LXXXIII (1, p. 284).

To Practice Charity

Another attempted justification of motive is to practice charity (almsgiving). That is, some have posited that it may be acceptable to sell spiritual things in order to give the proceeds to the poor. Gratian identified the error with this line of reasoning: “ It is objected that even if it is evil to buy ecclesiastical things, nevertheless sinister beginnings often reach happy outcomes. Just as Jacob reached the blessing through supplanting; as a crop that is sown by a leprous hand is nevertheless harvested clean; as a beautiful offspring is born from an adulterous union: so too money that is acquired through simony has a happy outcome when it is distributed to benefit the poor. But none of these things defends the simoniacs.”⁴⁶Gratian, Decretum, C. 1, q. 1, d.p.c. 24, § 1. And employing the words of Gregory, he summarized: “Committing the sins of the simoniacal heresy under the pretext of almsgiving must be strictly avoided. For it is one thing to give alms on account of sins and quite another to commit sins on account of almsgiving.”⁴⁷Ibid., C. 1, q. 1, c. 27, § 2; cf. Gregory I, Registrum Epistolarum, IX.218 (2, 207:24–27).

Puritan writers concurred. Henry Burton recorded that people made similar objections in his own time, claiming to use for a charitable purpose money received for preferment.⁴⁸“Another objection doth here cross my way on the patron’s behalf, Sir, you need not be so rigid against giving and receiving for a spiritual preferment: for, for my part, I have a good intent to convert such money to some charitable use, as to bestow it in alms, etc.” Burton, A Censure of Simonie, 65. To answer this objection, he appealed to Gratian, as cited above,⁴⁹Ibid., 65–66. and further described such charity as no different from the purchase of the field of blood with Judas’s blood money.⁵⁰“Like the high priests’ charity, who with Judas treason-money, by some called simony, bought, forsooth, a field to bury strangers in. But for all this charitable work, by divine ordination (as Lyra saith) the field got such a name, as could never be washed off. For it is called, the field of blood to this day. Matt. 27:8.” Ibid., 66. John Downame was no less severe, describing those who give alms out of money gotten by simony as “much more abominable” than those who give out of money gotten by oppression.⁵¹“But much more abominable are their alms, who spoil the Church by simony and sacrilege, and taking into their possession the portion of Levi, which is consecrated unto God, think to please the Lord, and as it were, satisfy for their sin, by giving some small alms to the poor, or keeping good hospitality of the spoils of the Church. And that not only for the time past, but with a resolution to continue still in their sin, paying these pittances to the poor, as the price or penalty of their sacrilegious wickedness: but unto these may be well fitted the saying of the Holy Ghost. Prov. 21:27. The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination: How much more when he bringeth it with a wicked mind?” Downame, The Plea of the Poore, 67. As with the wages of a prostitute (Deut. 23:18), the ill-gotten gain of simony may not be offered to the Lord.⁵²“If the hire of an harlot, or price of a dog, might not be consecrated unto God, because they were an abomination unto him, then neither may we offer that which we have gotten by stealth and robbery […] Whereby it appeareth that men cannot lawfully give alms out of those goods which they have gotten by theft and rapine, bribery and extortion, simony and usury, dicing and unlawful gaming.” Ibid., 64–65.

To Encourage Charity

A less common but related justification is that of encouraging charity. Rather than laundering simoniacal proceeds through almsgiving, this argument holds that the sale of spiritual things encourages good works, since it induces the purchaser to give.

Albert the Great presented this objection for charging for entry to a religious society: “Further, it is not evil to induce men to give alms; therefore if they induce [them] to bestow an alms by receiving a man whom they otherwise would not receive, it is not evil; therefore it is not simony.”⁵³Albert the Great, Commentarii in IV Sententiarum, IV, d. 25, a. 5, quaest., s.c. 2 (p. 92b). Albert did not answer this objection directly, but effectively dismissed it by holding that the sale of spiritual things is wrong regardless of motive. A house may count the devotion a man’s generosity shows toward it among his qualifications for entry, but his reception on account of his gift may never take place by way of agreement.⁵⁴Ibid., IV, d. 25, a. 5, ad quaest. (p. 94b); Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 4.

The objection therefore fails on its own terms: a payment made in exchange for some spiritual benefit is not charity but commerce. True almsgiving should be motivated by good will, but an exchange by agreement corrupts the nature of the good works by attaching a contractual reward. On this point, one canon reasoned, “For we have never read that the Lord’s disciples, or those converted by their ministry, enticed anyone to the worship of God by the intervention of any payment.”⁵⁵Gratian, Decretum, C. 1, q. 2, c. 2. Generosity may and should be motivated by divine reward (Prov. 19:17; Heb. 11:6), but this is granted in indeterminate timing and apart from human contract (Matt. 6:3–4).

Simony in the sale of indulgences and prayers provides a clear example of how such purchases are contrary to charity. The one who purchases an indulgence under the pretense of almsgiving offers no real sacrifice since he seeks to secure a benefit from man. While many of the schoolmen did not see inconsistency in defending these practices,⁵⁶For indulgences, see Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 20, p. 2, a. un., q. 4, ad 1 (pp. 536–37); for prayers, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad 2. Protestants and proto-Reformers highlighted the hypocrisy. As Peter Martyr Vermigli remarked of the religion of Rome, “With their indulgences they corrupt good works: for they take away from alms their proper end, the glory of God. They say they are given so that punishments may be taken away.”⁵⁷Vermigli, Loci Communes, 3.8.37 (p. 612).

To Uphold Custom

Another attempted justification was custom (consuetudo), which in canon law can carry legal force. One may reason that a longstanding practice cannot be simoniacal, for if it were, it would have been corrected long ago. Furthermore, to uphold the customs of the church would appear to be a worthy objective that warrants participation in the transactions they require. Liber extra disabused its reader of this notion in many chapters,⁵⁸Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.8, 9, 16, 19, 21, 36, 39. John Major likewise addressed this issue at length, Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio B), d. 25, q. 4 (foll. 186ra–187rb). which we will now here consider.

The Council of Tours (1163) explained the basic principle: “The passage of time does not diminish a sin, but aggravates it.”⁵⁹Mansi, ed., Council of Tours (1163), 6 (Mansi 21:1178); cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.8. The Third Lateran Council (1179) addressed those who pleaded long custom for charging to enthrone bishops and abbots, install priests, bury the dead, bless those marrying, or confer other sacraments. It called them “blinded by greed” and warned that anyone who persisted would “have his portion with Gehazi.”⁶⁰“Many think that this is permitted to them, because they consider that long-standing custom has given it the force of law, not sufficiently paying attention—since they are blinded by greed—to the fact that crimes are all the graver for how long they have held the unhappy soul bound. […] If anyone shall presume to act against this, let him know that he will have his portion with Gehazi, whose deed he imitates by exacting a shameful reward.” Mansi, ed., Third Lateran Council, 7 (Mansi 22:221–22); cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.9.

In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Innocent III addressed a particularly creative evasion. Certain suffragans had been exacting payment for chrism. Hoping to elude the archbishop’s correction, they did not cease but merely moved forward the timing of the payment and renamed it: first “chrismals,” then “paschals,” and finally “mid-Lenten customs.” Innocent responded that renaming the payment does not absolve from guilt. Such deception is to “cloak simony under an honest name,” but “God is not mocked.”⁶¹“Gaping after shameful gain and saying in their hearts, ‘There is no God,’ they cloak simony under an honest name, as though by changing the name the guilt and the penalty would be transferred. But God is not mocked, according to the apostle, nor will such followers of Simon—even if they perhaps evade temporal [punishment] in the present—escape eternal punishment in the future, since neither will the respectability of a name cloak the malice of the crime, nor will a word be able to abolish guilt.” Innocent III, Reg., II.96 (208:4–9); cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.36.

The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) was especially direct. It identified the practice of defending simoniacal exactions by appeal to custom and gave the definitive rejoinder: “We utterly reject this custom, which ought rather to be called a corruption.”⁶²“Some endeavor to defend this baseness and depravity by a custom long observed. Wishing therefore to abolish so great an abuse, we utterly reject this custom [consuetudinem], which ought rather to be called a corruption [corruptela], firmly decreeing that for these things—whether to be conferred or already conferred—no one presume under any pretext whatsoever to exact or extort anything. Otherwise both the one who receives and the one who gives such a wholly condemned price shall be condemned along with Gehazi and Simon.” Mansi, ed., Fourth Lateran Council, 63 (Mansi 22:1051C); cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.39. While a custom may have the force of law, corruption cannot.⁶³A corruptela does not bind: Major, In Quartum Sententiarum (Redactio B), d. 25, q. 4 (fol. 186vb). This same council ordered that laypeople who undermined pious customs of giving out of “the leaven of heretical depravity” should be restrained.⁶⁴Mansi, ed., Fourth Lateran Council, 66 (Mansi 22:1054); cf. Gregory IX, Liber extra, 5.3.42. Yet the same canon prohibited clerical exactions.

Righteous Indignation

It is not sufficient merely to abstain from the earnest desire to buy or sell spiritual things; one must actively hate simony. As Gregory the Great admonished, “whoever does not burn vehemently to amend this crime out of regard for his office, let him not doubt that he will have his portion with him from whom this defiling outrage first arose.”⁶⁵Gregory I, Registrum Epistolarum, XII.9 (2, 357:3–5). This is most frequently cited in the form that carried into canon law: “Whoever, therefore, does not burn vehemently against the simoniacal and neophyte heresy [i.e., the promotion of those who are not qualified (1 Tim. 3:6)] according to the station of his office, let him not doubt that he will have his portion with him who first committed this defiling outrage.” Gratian, Decretum, C. 1, q. 1, c. 5; cf. Wido, Widonis monachi epistola, 5:10–13. In binding the duty to the office one holds, Gregory indicated that those in greater positions must exhibit a greater passion against the sin. Yet that is not to suggest that those who hold no particular office have no responsibility to burn against simony. The duty is measured by capacity: inasmuch as one has a voice against this sin, he must proportionally have the heart to use it in earnest.

While many works on simony quote this remark from Gregory, the Anatomy of Simon Magus stands out as one that not only does so,⁶⁶The Anatomy of Simon Magus, 70. but returns to emphasize this same point repeatedly. For example, the Anatomist wrote, “If the heinousness and impiety of this sin of simony were seriously considered, it could not but beget a perfect detestation and abhorrency thereof, in the heart of any true Christian.”⁶⁷Ibid., 98. A lack of disgust proceeds from too little meditation on the sin, or from no conversion at all. Again, he exhorted the reader, “Wherefore I beseech you, if ever any man shall henceforth come to tempt you to such a simoniacal bargain, by the offer of money, or any bribe, let your indignation evidence your abhorrency of such a sin, and your detestation of such a person; and say to him as Simon Peter said to Simon Magus, ‘Thy money perish with thee.’ And I’m sure the reward of such honest zeal shall meet you in heaven.”⁶⁸Ibid., 188–89.

Conclusion

Simony not only exists in a completed transaction, but in various stages as it extends from an internal earnest desire to outward expression and execution, from mental to conventional to real. Canon law may penalize only what is outward and adjudicable, but before God the will alone suffices to make a simoniac.

Nor can an innocent motive excuse the earnest desire to buy or sell spiritual things. The justifications examined above—sustaining a religious community, supplying alms, encouraging charity, upholding custom—were each answered by the schoolmen and canonists. A pious end does not alter the nature of a simoniacal exchange. Genuine necessity may limit whether a community can take on the burden of more members, and voluntary giving is permitted if it is not suggestive of an exchange, but no goodness of intention converts the sale of spiritual things into something lawful.

Finally, because the sin consists in a desire, the remedy also lies in the heart. It is not enough to refuse simoniacal bargains; one must hate them, each according to his capacity.